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Nominalistic content, grounding, and covering generalizations: Reply to ‘Grounding and the indispensability argument’

'Grounding and the indispensability argument' presents a number of ways in which nominalists can use the notion of grounding to rebut the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects. I will begin by considering the strategy that puts grounding to the service of easy-road nominalists (section 1). I will give some support to this strategy by addressing a worry some may have about it (section 2). I will then consider a problem for the fast-lane strategy (section 3) and a problem for easy-road nominalists willing to accept Author’s grounding strategy (section 4). Both are related to the problem of formulating nominalistic explanations at the right level of generality. I will then consider a problem that Author only hints at (section 5). This problem has to do with mathematics' function of providing the sort of covering generalizations we need in scientific explanations. 
1. Nominalistic content meets grounding
According to Author, his strategy
provides abstract expressionists with a general response to the content challenge. Where a claim implies the obtaining of a relation between a physical object and a number, the abstract expressionist should ask what grounds the obtaining of this relation. [. . .] the platonist should appeal to a nominalistic property in virtue of which the relation obtains. The abstract expressionist can then say that the claim conveys the following: that the object instantiates that property. (p. 14)
Let me generalize the suggestion a little. Confronted with a claim S, the abstract expressionist can say that the claim conveys what, according to the platonist, grounds S.​[1]​ My first issue concerns to what extent easy-road nominalists can accept the suggestion. I will consider one particular kind of easy roader, the so-called hermeneutic fictionalist. Hermeneutic Fictionalism about mathematical talk is defined as the thesis that, when making a claim by uttering a mathematical sentence S, one asserts only the concrete (aka 'nominalistic') content of S, ||S||, and not its full content |S|.​[2]​ The typical definition of concrete content ||S|| is attributed to Gideon Rosen. Yablo has formulated it as follows: 
||S|| is the proposition true in a world w iff S is true in some v concretely indiscernible from w, albeit perhaps richer than w in mathematical objects. (Yablo 2010, p. 3)
Let me put forward this conjecture: 
(C) ||S|| = that in virtue of which |S| obtains.
I put forward this conjecture not to defend it, but because I think it is crucial for easy-road nominalists to evaluate it. Were the conjecture true, the classic definition of nominalistic content would be compatible with the grounding strategy. Were the conjecture false, easy-road nominalists willing to adopt the grounding strategy would have to give up their old definition of nominalistic content. This is why this issue requires careful scrutiny.
Conjecture (C) looks plausible if we consider Author’s example where S = 'The mass of this chair in kg is 8'. We have here that:
(1) The mass of this chair in kg is 8 in virtue of the chair’s having-mass-8-kg.
I will argue that ||S||= that this chair has-mass-8-kg. 
Suppose ||S|| is true at a world w. This means that w is concretely indistinguishable from a world v in which the mass of this chair in kg = 8. Given that (a) |S| holds in v in virtue of the fact that in v this chair has the concrete property of having-mass-8-kg and (b) that w is concretely indistinguishable from v, this means that in w that chair has-mass-8-kg.
Conversely, suppose that in a world w this chair has mass-8-kg: it is easy to find a world concretely indiscernible from w in which |S| is true: just bring numbers in it.​[3]​
Conjecture C therefore seems plausible if we limit our attention to very simple cases. This seems to be good news for hermeneutic fictionalists. However, I think conjecture (C) is dubious in the context of more complex cases. Still, it is important not to confuse this worry with another worry that can arise about combining the grounding strategy with easy-road nominalism. I will reserve for section 4 my presentation of what I take to be a good reason to doubt conjecture (C). In the next section, I will tackle what I take to be a bad reason to be sceptical about using the notion of grounding to support easy-road nominalism.

2. A misguided worry about the grounding strategy
I want to address and then dismiss a worry that can arise regarding Author’s strategy in the easy-road version. It's a worry that does not appear often in print, but that often surfaces in conversation. It is related to the content challenge. Consider the claim that:
(2) There exists a differentiable function that maps from the space-time manifold to the real numbers in virtue of (ii) the space-time manifold being mappable into real numbers. 
Let us grant that (ii) is about a nominalistic property, i.e., a property that the space-time manifold possesses also in possible worlds where there are no abstract mathematical objects. But in order to state (ii) in a precise and intelligible way, I need to mention mathematical objects (real numbers, graphs). The worry I am concerned with is: does this mean that in order for (ii) to obtain there need to be mathematical entities, after all?
The reply to this is that there is no reason to think that nominalistic properties need to be expressed in a nominalistic language. As Yablo (forthcoming) aptly notes, the task of expressing the nominalistic content of a claim is that of representing a world in which mathematical objects are absent, not that of representing a world without using mathematical vocabulary. The fact that we need mathematical language to represent a nominalistic world is no more a problem for those who believe in a number-free world than the fact that we need natural language to represent the world during the Mesozoic era is a problem for those who believe in a human-free world.
To borrow Yablo's example, to argue that:
(A) we can’t imagine without-numbers a complex world 
therefore
(B) we can’t imagine a complex world lacking in numbers 
is like arguing that:
(B) we can’t imagine a tree non-perceptually 
therefore
    we can’t imagine unperceived trees
or that:
(C) Matteo cannot see Mattia without (using) glasses
therefore
   Matteo cannot see Mattia unless Mattia is wearing glasses
Given that idealist arguments of form (B) and arguments of the form (C) are usually not taken seriously, the same should hold for platonist arguments of the form (A). 

3. Grounding and generality: a problem for the fast lane
(1) was a particularly easy example to cope with, both for nominalists travelling on the fast lane and for those travelling on the easy road. Suppose we move to another example considered by Author:
(3) Königsberg has-graph-theoretical-structure g in virtue of (iii) the physical structure of Königsberg
The problem here is that the physical structure of the city can be described at various levels of generality. For instance, we could choose a complete description of the city's structure, in which not only facts concerning Konigsberg's bridges are taken into account, but also, say, the distribution of churches in the city. But even limiting our attention to facts about Konigsberg’s bridges, there are various candidates for the role of (iii). We have to choose between the property of having a land mass reachable by any of three bridges and the property of having a land mass reachable by an odd number of bridges.​[4]​
Author is aware of the problem. And an important part of his dialectic is to stress that the demand of a ground for facts involving abstract entities is directed primarily to platonists. Given this, the problem of finding the right level of generality for the grounding properties is surely not just a problem for nominalists. Maybe it is not even a problem for all kinds of nominalist. It is a problem for friends of Author’s fast lane. They need to specify the right property to give nominalistic reformulations of scientific theories. One of their strategies could be to argue that their account is parasitic on that of the platonists. As Author states: "if there are many possible properties for platonists to appeal to, that provides correspondingly many alternatives for travellers on the fast lane to try out”(section 3).
There is still a risk for friends of the fast lane: that replacing cRo with R-oc in our explanations results in a less illuminating explanation, because it is not at the right level of generality. The mathematical explanation of why you cannot have a round walk through Königsberg crossing each bridge exactly once is that Königsberg’s graph has a vertex of odd degree (call the italicized sentence S). S is grounded in Königsberg’s possessing some kind of physical structure (our R-o); let’s call that structure Königsberg’s having-a-land-mass-reachable-by-an-odd-number-of-bridges (hyphens serve to stress that we are dealing with a nominalistic property). Call S* the sentence that expresses the fact that grounds S. S* can be spelled out as a sort of disjunction:
(S*) either Königsberg has-a-land-mass-reachable-by-one-bridge or Königsberg has-a-land-mass-reachable-by-three-bridges or Königsberg has-a-land-mass-reachable-by-five-bridges . . .
But a principle commonly accepted about grounding relations is that the truth of a disjunction is grounded in the truth of one of its disjuncts (see Rosen 2010). This means that S* is grounded in (say) the fact that Königsberg has-a-land-mass-reachable-by-three-bridges.​[5]​ Call the last mentioned fact S**. S** grounds S* and S* grounds S. If grounding is transitive (another reasonable assumption), this means that S** grounds S as well. So it seems that travellers on the fast lane should say that the reason you cannot have a round walk through Königsberg crossing each bridge exactly once is that Königsberg has-a-land-mass-reachable-by-three-bridges.​[6]​ But this seems to pick up the wrong candidate for the role of explanans. The fact that Königsberg has-a-land-mass-reachable-by-three-bridges contains too many extra details: had the land mass been reachable by five bridges, it would have been the same. The nominalistic replacement of S with the ground of S seems to result in an explanation run at the wrong level of generality. The mathematical explanation offered by the platonist seems more illuminating than the non-mathematical one. (Note that even if it is true that the platonist must provide a ground for the mathematical fact expressed by S, this doesn’t mean that she needs to appeal to that ground when formulating her explanations.) Fast laners can of course resist in various ways the charge of having provided a worse explanation than platonists, but I won’t pursue the issue here. Rather, I will discuss how the problem of formulating scientific explanations at the right level of generality affects the prospects of hermeneutic fictionalists for adopting (a generalized version of) Author’s suggested reply to the content challenge.

4. More on the grounding strategy and easy-road nominalism
In the last section I was concerned with problems for travellers on the fast lane. One problem was this: friends of the fast lane want to replace claims of the form cRo with claims of the form R-oc, but there are many possible properties that can play the role of R-oc. How can they choose the one with the right level of generality?
Easy-road nominalists do not face the same problem. First of all, they do not need to specify the ground of S in nominalistic terms: part of their theory is that, for some suitable S, the only way to convey S’s nominalistic content of S||S|| is by uttering S.
Moreover, if you accept the Rosen-Yablo definition of S’s nominalistic content ||S| presented in section 1, you don't need to wrestle to find the right level of generality: if in w there is an object o that has property P, and in w' there is an object o' that has property P', and |S| can obtain in virtue of both Po and P'o’, then both w and w' belong to ||S||. For instance, if S = the mass in kg of this chair is a number n, 7<n<10, both worlds in which this chair has-mass-in-kg-8 and worlds in which it has-mass-in-kg-9 belong to ||S||.
Still, this is not the end of the problems. Roughly, the problem I have in mind is this: what is the cost for hermeneutic fictionalists of embracing the grounding strategy? In section 1 it was conjectured that:
(C) ||S|| = what grounds |S|
I argued in section 1 that understanding whether this equivalence holds is important in order to evaluate the cost for hermeneutic fictionalists of adopting (a generalized version of) Author’s reply to the content challenge. If (C) is not correct, adopting the grounding strategy comes at the cost of renouncing the old definition of nominalistic content. As we have seen, C seems fairly plausible in the context of simple claims like the one that the mass of this chair in kg is 8. But consider the nominalistic content of the claim that the mass in kg of this chair lies between 7 and 10.​[7]​ According to the Rosen-Yablo definition, it is something like an infinite disjunction:
(||S||) = either this chair has-mass- 7.1-kg or this chair has-mass-7.01-kg or . . . 
But now we can apply the same train of thought as in the previous section. As noted, a principle commonly accepted about grounding relations is that the truth of a disjunction is grounded in the truth of one of its disjuncts (see Rosen 2010).​[8]​ So it seems that what grounds ||S|| is something more specific than ||S||, namely the obtaining of one of its disjuncts. If grounding is transitive (another reasonable assumption), then what grounds ||S|| grounds |S| as well. But what grounds ||S|| is distinct from ||S||. This means that what grounds |S| is distinct from ||S||. If this is correct, it means that hermeneutic fictionalists willing to adopt (a generalized version of) Author’s grounding strategy and use it to rebut the content challenge must give up their definition of nominalistic content and adopt a new one: the nominalistic content of S is what, according to the platonist, grounds S; it is not ||S||. Of course, we have the same problem as before: that replacing S with its ground results in running the explanation at the wrong level of generality. But we have an additional problem. One difference between hermeneutic fictionalists and friends of the fast lane is that only the formers take S’s nominalistic content to be what is really asserted when one quasi-asserts S. In other words, the nominalistic content is presented by hermeneutic fictionalists as the real content of our actual scientific explanations, not as a replacement of S that is part of a novel nominalistic scientific theory (which is, instead, what is developed by fast-lane nominalists). But one of the reasons one can assert a disjunction is precisely to avoid commitment to the truth of a particular disjunct. So it seems that what grounds S is not what is conveyed when we assert S. And if this is correct, we can draw the same moral as before: hermeneutic fictionalists should take a lot of care with (a generalized version of) Author’s suggestion that they define the nominalistic content of S as the ground of S.  
5. Mathematics and covering generalizations
The problem discussed in the previous section is connected with another problem. Explaining how grounding can assist in the identification of nominalistic explanations of some phenomena, Author states:
part of Lyon’s explanation of why no-one has ever walked across Konigsberg crossing each bridge exactly once is that Konigsberg is related to a particular graph by the has graph-theoreticalstructure relation and I argued that Lyon should explain why this relation obtains by saying that the city has a particular physical structure. (p. 8)
This is part of Lyon’s explanation, but certainly not the whole: after all, people were aware of Königsberg's physical structure long before solving the bridge problem. What is needed for an explanation of why nobody has ever crossed each bridge exactly one time is the combination of knowledge of Konigsberg's physical structure and of a covering generalization (on this see Yablo 2013): 
(cg) Everything with a certain physical structure is such that some trips around it are precluded
Friends of the explanatory version of the indispensability argument are likely to argue that the best way to argue for (cg) is by first noting that everything with a certain physical structure has a certain graph-theoretical structure and then adding a mathematical covering generalization:
(Mcg) everything with a certain graph-theoretical structure is such that some trips around it are precluded
This seems to be connected with Colyvan’s (2010) insistence on mathematics’ twofold contribution to empirical science: mathematics not only helps us to pick out the relevant phenomena we want to describe by enhancing our expressive powers, but also provides explanatory connections. Yablo (2012, 1021) makes a similar point by distinguishing “three grades of explanatory commitment”: “Math helps descriptively to the extent that we need it to specify” the phenomena we want to explain; “Math helps structurally if it’s needed to run the explanation at the right level of generality”; and finally “Math helps substantively, if it provides the covering generalization G”. Nominalists should account for all these contributions. The grounding strategy seems promising in the descriptive case. The problem of the right level of generality has already been discussed in the previous section. The problem here is how grounding can help nominalists to cope with the third role that mathematics plays, namely that of providing the right sort of covering generalization. 

One problem seems to be that such generalizations do not “imply the obtainment of a relation between an abstract mathematical object and a concrete one”(p. 8), so we cannot apply Author’s method to get their nominalistic content. 
This is not a substantive problem, though. One could argue that the nominalistic truth (cg) grounds the graph-theoretical truth (Mcg). This sounds plausible: say that having platonistic property P is grounded in having nominalistic property N (Author’s R-oc) and having platonistic property P’ is grounded in having nominalistic property N’. If this is the case, it is plausible to suppose that the fact that all the Ps are P’s is grounded in the fact that all the Ns are N’s.
But the risk of this strategy is that it fails to address the real problem. It is one thing to state a generalization but another to account for it. It is the latter task that is at stake here. The truth of MCg may be grounded in the truth of Cg, but where is the account of the connection between the two properties of Königsberg we are considering? The friend of the indispensability argument will argue that giving up the mathematical content of Mcg would leave us with no explanation of the necessary connection between the two physical properties of Königsberg.
We can formulate the problem as follows: can we give MCg a nominalistic content that accounts for its necessity? There seem to be some ways to do so. First, one could hypothesize that having a certain graph-theoretical structure just means satisfying certain axioms. And something can satisfy those axioms just in virtue of having certain physical properties. What mathematics helps us to discover is a logical truth, to the effect that:
(Mcg') everything that satisfies certain axioms has such other features as well (among them, not permitting certain trips).​[9]​ 
Logical truths like (Mcg') do not require the existence of mathematical objects, so they are nominalistically acceptable. And if we combine (Mcg') with the claim that everything with a certain physical structure satisfies certain axioms, we have a nominalistically kosher explanation of why some trips through Königsberg are not permitted. So it seems that, after all, the indispensability argument can be rejected also in this case. But it's worth noting that the strategy used here to rebut the indispensability argument does not appeal to the notion of grounding in the way Author suggests. More importantly, even if a grounding strategy can be made to work here, it is still worth noting the differences between claims like (1) or (2) and claims like (McG). 

6. Conclusions
Author presents a two-premise version of the indispensability argument. 
(1) Mathematics is indispensable to science: that is, our best explanations imply the existence of numbers and other mathematical entities.
(2) If mathematics is indispensable to science, then there are mathematical entities.
Therefore: there are mathematical entities.
We can see the kind of reply to the problem of covering generalizations presented in the previous section either as a negation of (1) or as a negation of (2), depending on the kind of nominalistic account of pure mathematics we choose. Hellman (1989) is probably better understood as a reformulation of mathematics that avoids the postulation of mathematical entities than as an account of the meaning of current mathematical theories, so it would be more in the spirit of those who endorse it to deny (1). (If a theory that does not postulate mathematical objects should not be qualified as 'mathematics', one could say that Hellman's account replaces mathematics with modal logic.) But other accounts, such as Yablo (2002), are compatible with the reply I suggested. In such an account, mathematical objects are conceived as essential representational aids used to convey a content about logical truths. This kind of account would deny not (1) but rather (2): numbers are present in our mathematical explanations to allow us to make claims that would be true even in their absence. Versions of if-then-ism can be cashed out in both fashions. 
In any case, it seems that this kind of response does not make use of the notion of grounding in the way advocated by Author. This suggests that nominalists can appeal to grounding in order to reply to some, but not all, versions of the content challenge or of the indispensability argument. These would be the versions in which nominalists are asked to explain the content of claims  stating that a concrete object stands in some relation with a mathematical one. Still, this reply must be supplemented with other work to account for mathematics' ability to provide covering generalizations.
Grounding could be a powerful weapon to block the indispensability argument, but it seems not to be the ultimate weapon. Or, at least, not yet.
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^1	  I will follow Author in considering grounding a relation between facts, so I should speak of what grounds <S> (the fact that S) rather than speaking of what grounds S. Moreover, I will avail myself of the phrase “the ground of S” to convey what, according to the platonist, grounds <S>. According to the nominalist, nothing grounds <S>, given that it is not the case that S.
^2	  Author’s 'abstract expressionists' are usually hermeneutic fictionalists: mathematics enhances our expressive powers precisely because sometimes the only way to express a proposition p is by uttering a math-infused sentence S such that p = ||S||. If this happens, it means we cannot find a non-math-infused sentence S* such that p =|S*|.
^3	  I am assuming that the existence of numbers and other mathematical objects is contingent relative to the conditions of the physical world. See Yablo (2012, p. 1013) for a defense of the legitimacy of this assumption. See also Author’s footnote 3 for reasons to call into question the assumption that mathematical entities are modally extreme (i.e., necessary-or-impossible).
^4	  The question at stake here is why no one has ever managed to have a round tour of Königsberg crossing each bridge exactly one time.
^5	  As a referee noted, this is a simplification. In the Königsberg case, more than one disjunct holds, so there is more than one disjunct grounding the disjunction. But this does not affect the substance of the point. First, we can easily think of analogous cases where the disjunction is such that only one disjunct holds (see for instance the example in the next paragraph). Moreover, a nominalistic explanation mentioning all the (finitely many) holding disjuncts still seems to be run at the wrong level of generality. 
^6	  Could fast-lane nominalists reply that both S* and S** ground S? I'm not sure that such a reply would help here: if S is grounded by S* and S**, but S** is more fundamental than S*, then in explaining why S obtains we should mention S**.
^7	  I consider this example rather than the one in the previous section because it facilitates the illustration of some points I am interested in.
^8	  In this case, only one disjunct holds, so it is the truth of that disjunct that grounds the truth of the disjunction. Note also that construing ||S|| as having quantificational structure wouldn’t change much: the truth of ||S|| would still be grounded in the truth of one of its instances.
^9	  See Yablo (2012, 1024-5): "What did Euler discover, then? He discovered logical truths to the effect that anything with the structural features postulated in the axioms (Königsberg, for example) has thus and such other features as well".
